

Content Analysis of 2024 Presidential Election Hoaxes

Ambar Arum^{1*}, Donny Hermawan Saputra²
Paramadina University

Corresponding Author: Ambar Arum ambardanarum@gmail.com

ARTICLE INFO

Keywords: Hoax, Presidential Election 2024, Content Analysis, Social Media

Received : 15, June

Revised : 20, July

Accepted: 25, July

©2025 Arum, Saputra : This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the [Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).



ABSTRACT

The 2024 Presidential Election in Indonesia was a crucial moment that triggered social friction, worsened by the spread of hoaxes on social media. This study analyzes 221 hoax samples from turnbackhoax.id, focusing on message forms, content characteristics, and hoax categories. Most hoaxes were in video format, widely shared on YouTube and TikTok, showing the dominance of video platforms in spreading misinformation. Many hoaxes targeted Gibran Rakabuming, especially around fake diploma claims and the Constitutional Court's ruling. The most common hoax types were misleading and manipulated content, often created using advanced technology, including AI. These findings highlight the urgent need for digital literacy to help citizens detect, report, and resist hoaxes, promoting informed and peaceful elections.

INTRODUCTION

A presidential election held every five years has always been a crucial moment in a political life in Indonesia. No exception to the 2024 election, which is also filled with dynamics and friction in the community. This political consistency tends to arouse conflict, one of which is triggered by bigotry over a couple of candidates. This conflict is increasingly sharpened by spreading information of lies or hoax that are circulating across various social media platforms, such as YouTube, Facebook, X (previously Twitter), and TikTok, which are then passed on by the order applications such as WhatsApp.

On November 14, 2023, the General Elections Commission (KPU) officially announced three pairs of presidential and vice-presidential candidates for the 2024 Presidential Election. Candidate pair number 1 is Anies Baswedan-Muhaimin Iskandar, number 2 is Prabowo Subianto-Gibran Rakabuming Raka, and number 3 is Ganjar Pranowo-Mahfud MD. In addition to the rivalry between candidate pairs, various issues also intensified the situation, such as the Constitutional Court's (MK) decision regarding the age limit for presidential and vice-presidential candidates, which was allegedly influenced by Joko Widodo (Jokowi); the cancellation of Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono (AHY) as Anies Baswedan's vice-presidential candidate; and the rising tension between Jokowi and the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP). All these issues became fertile ground for hoax creators to produce content that then spread widely and influenced public opinion.

Quoting from *The Conversation*, hoaxes circulating during elections can have three main negative impacts: character assassination, distrust toward election organizers, and image manipulation to boost the electability of certain candidates. Furthermore, hoaxes in the 2014 and 2019 Presidential Elections and the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial Election were proven to play a significant role in triggering conflict in Indonesia, as revealed by PPMN (Perhimpunan Pengembangan Media Nusantara). Therefore, addressing and understanding hoaxes has become an urgent need to maintain democratic stability.

This study aims to analyze the content of hoaxes that circulated during the 2024 Presidential Election campaign period, from November 28, 2023, to February 10, 2024, in accordance with the official KPU schedule. The content analysis method will be used in this study. Content analysis is a systematic and objective research technique to describe communication characteristics in terms of message form, content characteristics, and categorization of specific content. Data samples will be taken from the website turnbackhoaks.id, managed by Masyarakat Anti Fitnah Indonesia (MAFINDO), which documents various hoaxes from multiple social media platforms. More specifically, the researcher will only select hoax content samples related to the six presidential and vice-presidential candidates competing in the 2024 Presidential Election, namely Anies Baswedan, Muhaimin Iskandar, Prabowo Subianto, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, Ganjar Pranowo, and Mahfud MD.

This study has three main objectives. First, to identify the forms of hoax messages related to the 2024 Presidential Election. Second, to describe the characteristics of the circulating hoaxes. Third, to classify the hoaxes based on

their categories. The research results are expected to provide educational value regarding political misinformation and disinformation, particularly in the context of the 2024 Presidential Election. For the public, this research is useful to help them recognize, avoid, and report hoaxes to the authorities. Meanwhile, for the government, the results of this study are expected to serve as a reference in formulating anti-hoax policies and developing innovations to handle and prevent their spread.

While several studies have explored the presence and effects of hoaxes in Indonesia's past political contests—such as the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections—there remains a lack of focused research on the 2024 election, particularly using a systematic and quantitative content analysis approach. Most existing works tend to emphasize public perception or media impact, rather than closely examining the specific formats, distribution platforms, sentiment targets, and typologies of hoaxes. Furthermore, the emerging role of artificial intelligence in generating manipulated content has not been sufficiently addressed in the context of electoral disinformation. This study fills that gap by analyzing hoax content from the 2024 presidential campaign period, offering a data-based perspective on how political disinformation is shaped and spread in the current digital environment.

THEORETICAL REVIEW

Hoaxes

Hoaxes refer to false information deliberately spread to deceive or mislead the public. Wardle and Derakhshan (2017) categorize hoaxes into two main types: misinformation, which is false information shared without harmful intent, and disinformation, which is intentionally false information spread to deceive others. In the political context, hoaxes are frequently used to influence public opinion, deepen societal polarization, or discredit political opponents.

First Draft (2017), an organization dedicated to information literacy, identifies seven primary types of misinformation and disinformation: (1) satire or parody, (2) false connection (headlines, images, or captions that do not match the content), (3) misleading content, (4) false context, (5) imposter content, (6) manipulated content, and (7) fabricated content. These categories provide a conceptual basis for identifying the forms of hoaxes that circulated during the 2024 presidential election.

Social Media

Social media is a communication tool used in social processes (Mulawarman, 2017). More specifically, according to Kotler and Keller as cited in Taskiran and Yilmaz (2016), social media refers to platforms used to share text, images, audio, video, and information with others. Compared to conventional media, social media platforms lack the editorial gatekeeping and verification processes found in newspapers and television. Instead, they operate on user-generated content and algorithm-driven curation, which often prioritize engagement and sensationalism over accuracy.

Recent studies have shown that social media algorithms often direct users toward more extreme or emotionally charged content. This happens because the recommendation systems tend to show similar types of content repeatedly, creating echo chambers that reinforce certain views and make users more polarized. Engagement metrics like likes and shares act as social proof, further amplifying misinformation. Investigations by Avram et al. (2020) demonstrate that social engagement indicators significantly increase user susceptibility to false information.

Furthermore, a study by Audina and Wahyutama (2023) emphasizes that social media is the preferred platform for millennials to access political information. Their findings reveal that motivations such as cognitive needs, personal and social integration, affective engagement, and tension release drive political content consumption on these platforms. In the context of the 2024 presidential election, this underscores the central role of social media in shaping public understanding of political issues. However, the widespread reliance on social media as an information source also makes it vulnerable to the unchecked spread of disinformation.

Political content, including hoaxes, circulates rapidly and widely, often without undergoing verification. This reality aligns with the focus of this study, which conducts content analysis of hoaxes during the 2024 election campaign, and highlights how the nature of social media accelerates the dissemination of politically charged falsehoods that are difficult to distinguish from verified facts.

Content Analysis

According to Riffe, Lacy, and Fico, as cited by Ahmad (2018), content analysis is a systematic and replicable method for examining symbols of communication that are assigned numerical values based on valid measurements and analyzed using statistical techniques to describe communication content, draw conclusions, and provide contextual interpretation. Meanwhile, Berelson and Kerlinger define content analysis as a method for studying and analyzing communication in a systematic, objective, and quantitative manner, focusing on observable messages. This method is especially appropriate for examining large-scale data, as commonly found on social media platforms.

By applying this method, the present study seeks to understand the construction of hoax messages, the intentions behind them, and their impact on public opinion during the 2024 presidential election.




Figure 1. Conceptual Framework

METHODOLOGY

This study employs a content analysis method with a quantitative descriptive approach. The quantitative approach prioritizes the collection and analysis of numerical data to explain specific phenomena. According to Creswell (2018), quantitative research is an approach for testing objective theories by examining the relationship among variables. These variables, in turn, can be measured, typically on instruments, so that numbered data can be analyzed using statistical procedures. Sugiyono (2016) adds that quantitative research focuses on measurable data that can be processed mathematically to obtain objective and accurate results.

The descriptive nature of this research refers to the effort to portray specific phenomena in detail based on available data. Rukajat (2018) defines descriptive research as a type of research that describes phenomena in a realistic, factual, and contemporary manner.

The subject of this research is hoax content documented by the website turnbackhoaks.id, managed by MAFINDO (Masyarakat Anti Fitnah Indonesia). The hoax entries were collected during the official campaign period for the 2024 presidential election, which ran from 28 November 2023 to 10 February 2024. This study only analyzes hoax content that is related to the presidential and vice-presidential candidates of the 2024 election.

The analyzed content includes various message forms such as text, images or photos, and videos that circulated on social media platforms, including Facebook, X (formerly Twitter), Instagram, TikTok, and WhatsApp. Each piece of content is analyzed based on its characteristics, including the platform of origin, the type of message conveyed, and the sentiment expressed toward a specific presidential or vice-presidential candidate. In addition, hoax content is classified according to the seven hoax categories developed by First Draft,

namely satire, false connection, misleading content, false context, imposter content, manipulated content, and fabricated content.

To operationalize the variables included in the coding sheet, this study uses three main variables. The first is the form of the message, which consists of text, images or photos, and video formats. The second is the content characteristics, which refer to the platform used to disseminate the hoax and the sentiment directed toward the presidential or vice-presidential candidates, whether positive or negative. The third is the content category based on First Draft's typology. Notably, for the sentiment variable, each content may express more than one sentiment simultaneously. For instance, a single hoax could show a positive sentiment toward the Prabowo-Gibran pair while expressing a negative sentiment toward Ganjar.

The sample in this study is taken from hoax posts related to the 2024 presidential election, as documented by MAFINDO on the website turnbackhoaks.id. According to the website's archive, during the official campaign period from 28 November 2023 to 10 February 2024, there were 221 entries of hoax content that mentioned at least one of the presidential or vice-presidential candidates.

Data collection and analysis were conducted by first gathering all 221 hoax entries from turnbackhoaks.id that met the sampling criteria. The researcher then carried out a content analysis for each entry by filling out a coding sheet that includes the three main variables: message form, content characteristics, and content category. After completing the coding process, the data were tabulated, analyzed, and interpreted descriptively to produce findings that explain the patterns and characteristics of hoax dissemination during the 2024 presidential election campaign.

RESULTS

Table 1. Forms of Hoax Content Result

Forms of Hoax Content	Result (in percentage)
Image (photo)	12%
Video	87%
Text	1%

Out of the 221 hoax content samples analyzed, a total of 192 were in video format. This number significantly exceeds the 27 hoaxes in image format and just 2 in text format. In percentage terms, 87% of hoaxes related to the 2024 presidential election that circulated on social media were disseminated in the form of videos.

Table 2. Platform Result

Platform	Result (in percentage)
YouTube	36%

Facebook	17%
X	7%
Instagram	6%
Tiktok	32%
WhatsApp	2%

In terms of distribution across platforms, YouTube and TikTok were found to be the most dominant. Specifically, 80 hoax entries (36%) were shared via YouTube, and 71 entries (32%) via TikTok. The remaining hoaxes were distributed across other platforms such as Facebook, X (formerly Twitter), Instagram, and WhatsApp.

Table 3. Sentiment Result

Platform	Result (in percentage)
Anies Baswedan (positive)	16%
Anies Baswedan (negative)	8%
Muhaimin Iskandar (positive)	4%
Muhaimin Iskandar (negative)	1%
Prabowo Subianto (positive)	5%
Prabowo Subianto (negative)	19%
Gibran Rakabuming Raka (positive)	3%
Gibran Rakabuming Raka (negative)	27%
Ganjar Pranowo (positive)	9%
Ganjar Pranowo (negative)	3%
Mahfud MD (positive)	3%
Mahfud MD (negative)	2%

The analysis also reveals a clear dominance of hoax content expressing negative sentiment toward candidate pair number two, Prabowo Subianto and Gibran Rakabuming Raka. Gibran was the primary target of negative sentiment, appearing in 60 hoax entries or 27% of the total sample. Prabowo followed with 42 entries, or 19%. In contrast, Anies Baswedan was the subject of 35 hoax entries that conveyed positive sentiment.

Table 4. Hoax Category Result

Platform	Result (in percentage)
Satire	4%
False connection	0%
Misleading content	55%
False context	2%

Impostor content	2%
Manipulated content	35%
Fabricated content	1%

Lastly, the most prevalent hoax category identified in this study is misleading content, which accounted for more than half of all samples, 122 entries, or 55%. This was followed by manipulated content, which appeared in 77 entries, representing 35% of the total sample.

DISCUSSION

The Prevalence of Video Formats in Hoax Dissemination

The findings of this study underscore the significant role that video-based content plays in the dissemination of hoaxes during the 2024 Indonesian presidential election campaign. The dominance of video format, accounting for 87% of all hoax entries analyzed, demonstrates a clear shift in how disinformation is packaged and consumed in the digital era. Unlike text or static images, videos are inherently more dynamic, engaging, and emotionally resonant. They combine auditory and visual stimuli to increase cognitive retention, persuasion, and emotional impact. Hoax producers appear to leverage this psychological advantage to maximize the spread and impact of their content, especially in politically sensitive moments such as national elections.

YouTube and TikTok as Major Hoax Channels

The fact that YouTube and TikTok were the top platforms for hoax distribution, together accounting for nearly 70% of all entries, further supports the argument that video-driven platforms are particularly susceptible to, and efficient in, the spread of disinformation. YouTube, with its massive user base and powerful recommendation algorithms, provides fertile ground for content, whether accurate or misleading, to rapidly go viral. Similarly, TikTok's short-form video model, driven by rapid consumption and high engagement metrics, creates an ideal environment for emotionally charged or sensational hoaxes to proliferate. Unlike Facebook or X, which still accommodate a mix of text-based and multimedia content, these platforms are optimized for visual storytelling and thus present unique challenges for fact-checking mechanisms and regulatory oversight.

Moreover, this study highlights the complex and interconnected nature of digital platforms in the spread of hoaxes. The cross-platform migration of content, wherein a hoax originates on one platform like YouTube but is subsequently shared on others such as Facebook, X, or WhatsApp, demonstrates the viral and borderless nature of disinformation. This interconnectivity complicates efforts to track, contain, and respond to hoaxes effectively. It also points to the need for a collaborative and multi-platform approach in combating disinformation, involving social media companies, fact-checkers, civil society, and policymakers.

Gibran and Prabowo as Primary Victims

One of the most concerning findings of this study is the disproportionate volume of hoaxes directed at specific political figures, particularly Gibran

Rakabuming Raka and Prabowo Subianto, the vice-presidential and presidential candidates number two. Gibran received the highest proportion of negative sentiment, featured in 27% of all hoax entries. The content targeting him frequently revolved around issues such as the legitimacy of his candidacy and accusations of using a fake diploma, narratives that were likely designed to undermine public trust and sow doubt about the integrity of the electoral process. Prabowo was also a significant target, with 19% of hoaxes expressing negative sentiment against him. These findings suggest that disinformation is being weaponized to damage reputations and shift voter perception, a tactic that may have substantial implications for electoral fairness and public trust in democratic institutions.

Conversely, Anies Baswedan was the subject of positive sentiment in hoax narratives, appearing in 35 entries. This suggests that hoaxes are not only used to discredit opponents but also to manufacture or amplify support. The dual function of hoaxes, to attack and to promote, highlights their strategic use in shaping political discourse and influencing electoral outcomes. It also raises ethical concerns about the manipulation of public opinion through emotionally charged and often deceptive content.

Content Categories and Technological Escalation in Hoax Production

The analysis of hoax categories further enriches our understanding of how disinformation is structured and designed. Misleading content emerged as the most dominant category, accounting for 55% of the hoax entries. According to Wardle (2017), misleading content involves manipulating genuine information to present biased or distorted interpretations. This category often includes videos or images edited to remove context or selectively emphasize certain elements to create a particular narrative. Such tactics are difficult to detect, especially for audiences with low media literacy, and are particularly effective in polarizing public opinion.

Manipulated content was the second most common category, appearing in 35% of entries. These hoaxes frequently involved altered headlines, fake quotes, or doctored images designed to mimic legitimate news sources. The use of logos or branding from credible media outlets adds an extra layer of deception, making it harder for the public to distinguish between real and fabricated information. This underscores the importance of enhancing digital literacy and critical thinking skills among the public, particularly during politically sensitive periods such as elections.

One of the most alarming developments identified in this study is the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in the creation of hoaxes. A striking example involves a deepfake video purportedly showing a conversation between Ganjar Pranowo and PDIP chairperson Megawati Soekarnoputri. The video used AI-generated audio and facial animations that closely resembled the real individuals, creating a convincing yet entirely fabricated piece of content. The use of AI in hoax production represents a significant escalation in the sophistication of disinformation tactics. No longer limited to editing existing material, hoax producers can now fabricate entire narratives from scratch, blurring the line between reality and fiction.

This finding highlights the urgent need for regulatory frameworks, platform accountability, and technological interventions to address AI-generated misinformation. Furthermore, the increasing complexity of disinformation campaigns points to the importance of multi-stakeholder collaboration involving tech companies, fact-checkers, researchers, educators, and government institutions.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study successfully identified the forms, characteristics, and categories of hoax dissemination related to the 2024 Indonesian presidential election. The majority of hoaxes circulated during the campaign period were in video format, which proved to be the most effective medium for capturing public attention. Platforms such as YouTube and TikTok emerged as the main distribution channels, as both are optimized for visually and audibly engaging video content. These findings reinforce the notion that visual media has a stronger persuasive power compared to text or static images.

Political polarization was also reflected in the sentiments embedded within these hoaxes. Many targeted specific political figures, with Gibran Rakabuming Raka emerging as the most frequent subject of attack. These attacks largely revolved around accusations of a fake diploma and the controversial Constitutional Court ruling that enabled his candidacy. Such hoaxes are designed to erode public trust in targeted individuals and manipulate voter perceptions in favor of or against particular candidates.

Moreover, the study found that misleading content and manipulated content were the most dominant hoax categories. These types of hoaxes are deliberately crafted to mislead the public and shape opinion by manipulating seemingly authentic information. The use of artificial intelligence (AI) in producing fabricated content presents a new and growing challenge, as it enables the creation of highly convincing hoaxes that are increasingly difficult to distinguish from genuine information.

The findings of this study highlight the urgent need for increased digital literacy and public education to empower citizens to recognize and report hoaxes. When the public is equipped with critical thinking skills and the ability to discern between facts and falsehoods, the spread of disinformation can be significantly reduced. In parallel, the government and other stakeholders must collaborate to develop proactive policies and technological tools capable of detecting and preventing the spread of hoaxes effectively. This is essential to mitigate potential social conflict and ensure that voters can participate in the democratic process with clarity and informed judgment.

In addition to these efforts, it is recommended that educational institutions integrate media and information literacy into their curricula, especially ahead of major political events. Social media platforms should also be more transparent and accountable in moderating false content, including by enhancing partnerships with independent fact-checkers. Finally, future research should continue monitoring the evolution of AI-driven disinformation, particularly in electoral contexts, to anticipate and respond to emerging threats more comprehensively.

FURTHER STUDY

This study has several limitations that open opportunities for future research. The data were solely based on hoax entries from turnbackhoax.id, which may not capture the full range of disinformation circulating on less-monitored platforms such as WhatsApp or Telegram. Expanding data sources in future studies would provide a more comprehensive view of hoax dissemination.

Additionally, this study focused only on content targeting presidential and vice-presidential candidates, excluding hoaxes related to election institutions or other political actors. Broader scope in future research could reveal wider patterns of political disinformation.

Moreover, the use of quantitative content analysis does not account for audience reception. Future studies should explore how hoaxes affect public perception and behavior through surveys or interviews.

Given the rise of AI-generated misinformation, future research should also investigate the impact and detection of deepfakes and synthetic media in political contexts.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The authors would like to express their sincere gratitude to MAFINDO for providing open access to the hoax data through the turnbackhoax.id platform, which served as the primary source for this research. Appreciation is also extended to academic advisors and colleagues who offered valuable insights during the development of this study. This research would not have been possible without their collective support and guidance.

REFERENCES

- Ahmad, Jumal. (2018). *Desain Penelitian Analisis Isi (Content Analysis)*. *Jurnal Sekolah Pascasarjana UIN Syarif Hidayatullah*.
- Audina, Z., & Wahyutama, W. (2023). Media Sosial sebagai Preferensi Sumber Informasi Politik Generasi Milenial. *Jurnal Pendidikan Tambusai*, 7(2), 16097–16105. <https://doi.org/10.31004/jptam.v7i2.8921>
- Avram, M., Micallef, N., Patil, S., & Menczer, F. (2020). Exposure to social engagement metrics increases vulnerability to misinformation. *HKS Misinformation Review*. <https://doi.org/10.37016/mr-2020-033>
- Creswell, J. W., & Creswell, J.D. (2018). *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches (5th ed.)*. Sage Publications.
- First Draft News. (2017). Fake news is complicated. Retrieved from <https://firstdraftnews.org/articles/fake-news-complicated/>
- Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU). (2023). KPU gelar pengundian dan penetapan nomor urut pasangan calon presiden dan wakil presiden Pemilu 2024. Retrieved from <https://www.kpu.go.id/berita/baca/12088/kpu-gelar->

pengundian- dan-penetapan-nomor-urut-pasangan-calon-presiden-dan-wakil-presiden-pemilu-2024

- Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU). (2024). Kilas Pemilu tahun 2024. Retrieved from <https://www.kpu.go.id/page/read/1136/kilas-pemilu-tahun-2024>
- Mastel. (2017). Hasil survei wabah hoax nasional 2017. Retrieved from <https://mastel.id/hasil-survey-wabah-hoax-nasional-2017/>
- Mulawarman, M., & Nurfitri, A. D. (2017). Perilaku Pengguna Media Sosial beserta Implikasinya Ditinjau dari Perspektif Psikologi Sosial Terapan. *Buletin Psikologi*, 25(1). <https://doi.org/10.22146/buletinpsikologi.22759>
- Oktaviana, T., & Hasfi, N. (2020). ANALISIS ELEMEN BERITA HOAKS DI WEBSITE. *Interaksi Online*, 8(3), 21-31. Retrieved from <https://ejournal3.undip.ac.id/index.php/interaksi-online/article/view/28163>
- Perhimpunan Pengembangan Media Nusantara (PPMN). (2021). Hoaks dan ancaman terhadap demokrasi di Indonesia. Retrieved from <https://ppmn.or.id/program-ppmn/hoaks-dan-ancaman-terhadap-demokrasi-di-indonesia/>
- Rukajat, A. (2018). *Pendekatan Penelitian Kualitatif (Qualitative Research. Approach)*. Deepublish.
- Sosiawan, E. A., & Wibowo, R. (2020). Kontestasi berita hoax pemilu Presiden tahun 2019 di media daring dan media sosial. *Jurnal Ilmu Komunikasi*, 17(2), 133-142.
- Sugiyono. (2016). *Metode Penelitian Kuantitatif, Kualitatif, dan R&D*. Bandung: Alfabeta.
- Suryadi, D., Nugraha, F., & Misbach, T. M. (2022). Penyebaran Hoax Politik Pada Media Sosial. *Jurnal komunikasi*, 1(1).
- Taskiran, N. O., Yilmaz, R. (2015). *Handbook of Research on Effective Advertising Strategies In The Social Media Age*. IGI Global.
- The Conversation. (2023). 3 dampak negatif hoaks Pemilu yang perlu kamu tahu. Retrieved from <https://theconversation.com/3-dampak-negatif-hoaks-pemilu-yang-perlu-kamu-tahu-218831>
- Turn Back Hoax. (2024). [SALAH] Rekaman Percakapan Ganjar dan Megawati. Retrieved from <https://turnbackhoax.id/2024/01/31/salah-rekaman-percakapan-ganjar-dan-megawati/>